




Existential	 instantiation	 is	 a	 rule	 of	 inference	 that	 allows	 us	 infer,	 from	 the	
proposition	that	there	are	some	p	things,	the	proposition	that	a	is	a	p	thing.	What	





























What	 role	 does	 ‘a’	 play	 in	 line	 3,	 and	 then	 again	 in	 line	 4?	 Although	 existential	
instantiation	is	discussed	in	standard	textbooks	on	first-order	logic,	typically	not	much	




















defend	 what	 they	 call	 ‘arbitrary	 reference’,	 the	 view	 that	 we	 can	 refer	 to	 things	
arbitrarily.	Nevertheless,	their	main	argument	for	arbitrary	reference	depends	on	this	
view	of	the	role	of	‘a’.	They	argue:	In	line	3	we	get	‘a’	to	refer	to	a	p	thing;	we	can	only	





I	 am	 persuaded	 by	 B&M’s	 arguments	 against	 meaningless	 symbol	 accounts	 of	 ‘a’,	


















There	 are	 also	 problems	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 ‘a’	 refers	 to	 a	 p	 thing	 even	 for	 some	
properties	p	that	have	actual	instances.	
	
First,	 let	 p	 be	 the	 property	 of	 being	 male.	 This	 has	 actual	 instances.	 But	 if	 q	 is	 a	
property	that	is	inconsistent	with	p,	such	as	being	not	male,	then	there	are	no	possible	























(that	 is,	 a	 thing	 that	 supposedly	 has	 p).	 Moreover,	 this	 might	 still	 give	 B&M	 an	
argument	 for	 arbitrary	 reference,	 as	 follows:	 In	 line	 3	 we	 get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	 a	













We	 might	 try	 saying	 this:	 by	 adding	 lines	 3	 and	 4	 to	 the	 argument	 we	 break	 the	
inference	down	into	some	smaller	steps,	each	of	which	is	more	clearly	valid	than	the	









there	 to	 be	 some	 p	 things	 without	 a	 being	 a	 p	 thing.	 So	 we	 need	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	













Another	 common	 way	 of	 adding	 lines	 to	 an	 argument	 to	 make	 its	 validity	 more	
apparent	is	to	make	a	supposition.	Perhaps	we	can	say	that	in	line	3	we	are	making	a	
supposition?	 No,	 we	 cannot	 say	 this	 either.	 If	 3	 is	 a	 supposition	 then	 it	 has	 to	 be	












This	 cannot	be	 the	extended	argument.	 For	 from	which	of	 the	previous	 lines	does	C	
follow?	 We	 have	 lines	 1,	 2	 and	 5	 available	 (3	 and	 4	 are	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
supposition).	It	is	no	help	to	say	that	it	follows	from	lines	1	and	2	because	that’s	what	
we	are	trying	to	show.	It	does	not	follow	from	lines	1	and	5	(it	is	possible	for	1	and	5	to	
be	 true	without	 C	 being	 true)(remember	 that	 according	 to	 the	 account	 that	we	 are	
developing,	 ‘a’	 is	 not	 a	 variable	 –	 it	 refers	 to	 something	 –	 and	 5	 is	 not	 a	 universal	













This	 cannot	 be	 the	 extended	 argument	 either,	 because	 it	 does	 not	 have	 the	 right	
conclusion.	 Perhaps	 there	 is	 an	 implicit	 further	 conclusion,	 C":	 There	 are	 some	 q	
things.	 (This	 is	 just	 a	 repetition	 of	 C,	 but	 this	 time	 it	 is	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
supposition.)	But	from	which	of	the	previous	lines	does	C"	follow?	We	have	lines	1,	2	
and	C'	available	(3,	4	and	C	are	within	the	scope	of	the	supposition).	It	is	no	help	to	say	






why	 adding	 lines	 3	 and	4	 is	 helpful	we	 cannot	 say	 that	 line	 3	 follows	 from	previous	
lines,	but	nor	can	we	say	that	it	is	a	supposition.	
	



























to	say	this:	we	get	 ‘a’	 to	refer	to	a	supposedly	p	thing.	The	 idea	 is	this:	by	supposing	
that	 there	are	some	p	 things	we	make	 it	 the	case	 that	 there	are	some	supposedly	p	




The	 crucial	 part	 of	 this	 proposal	 is	 the	 following	 claim:	 by	 supposing	 that	 there	 are	
some	p	things	we	make	it	the	case	that	there	are	some	supposedly	p	things.	We	need	
not	 claim	 that	 these	 supposedly	p	 things	are	always	created	 by	 the	 supposition.	We	
can	allow	that	we	can	suppose	that	there	are	some	p	things	by	thinking	about	some	
actual	 things	and	 supposing	 that	 they	have	p	–	 in	 this	 case	we	wouldn’t	be	 creating	
these	things	(there	already	are	these	things),	we	would	just	be	making	it	the	case	that	









This	 claim,	 that	 if	 we	 suppose	 that	 there	 are	 some	 p	 things	 then	 there	 are	 some	
supposedly	 p	 things,	 is	 obviously	 a	 controversial	 claim.	 But	 it	 is	 in	 good	 company	 –	
there	 is	 a	 precedent	 for	 this	 kind	 of	 claim	 in	 theories	 of	 fiction.	 According	 to	 some	
theories	of	fiction,	if	an	author	creates	a	work	of	fiction,	and	it	is	part	of	the	fiction	that	
there	 are	 some	 p	 things,	 then	 the	 author	 thereby	makes	 it	 the	 case	 that	 there	 are	
some	fictionally	p	things	(that	is,	some	things	that	fictionally	have	p)(see	for	example	




the	 case	 that	 there	 are	 some	 fictionally	 p	 things.	What	 I	 am	 suggesting	 is	much	 the	







Note	 that	 the	 account	 of	 ‘a’	 that	 I	 am	 suggesting	 here	 is	 different	 from	 the	 p	 thing	
account	defended	by	B&M.	Both	accounts	are	referential	accounts	(i.e.	both	claim	that	
we	use	‘a’	to	refer	to	something),	but	whereas	the	B&M	account	says	that	we	use	it	to	
refer	 to	 a	 p	 thing,	 this	 account	 says	 that	we	use	 it	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 supposedly	 p	 thing.	








crucial	 claim,	 that	 if	we	 suppose	 that	 there	 are	 some	 p	 things	 then	 there	 are	 some	





















we	are	considering	one	of	 these	p	things	–	we	actually	are	 considering	one	of	 them.	
But	by	introducing	‘a’	in	line	3	all	that	we	are	doing	is	giving	ourselves	a	way	of	talking	






p.	 Then,	 in	 line	3,	we	get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	one	of	 these	 things	 that	 supposedly	have	p	
(fixing	the	reference	of	‘a’	arbitrarily	to	one	of	them,	if	there	are	more	than	one).	
	
Having	 fixed	 the	 reference	of	 ‘a’	 to	one	of	 the	supposedly	p	 things	we	can	 then	 talk	
about	 this	 thing,	and	say	what	 is	 true	of	 it	on	 the	 supposition	 that	 the	premises	are	
both	 true.	On	 this	 supposition	 line	3	 (“a	 is	a	p	 thing”)	 is	 true,	not	because	 it	 follows	

















Second,	what	 if	p	 is	such	that	there	are	no	possible	p	things?	Answer:	 if	we	suppose	




Third,	 what	 if	 p	 and	 q	 are	 such	 that	 the	 premises	 are	 inconsistent?	 Answer:	 if	 we	
suppose	 that	 there	are	 some	p	 things	 then	 there	are	 some	 things	which	 supposedly	
have	 p,	 even	 if	 other	 assumptions	 are	 inconsistent	with	 this	 assumption,	 and	 these	
things	are	available	 for	 ‘a’	 to	refer	 to.	Compare	the	 fictional	case:	 there	 is	a	 fictional	
character	Sherlock	Holmes,	even	if	the	stories	about	Sherlock	Holmes	are	inconsistent.	
Note	that	under	 inconsistent	suppositions	everything	 is	 true,	so	the	account	predicts	




Fourth,	what	 if	p	 is	 the	property	of	being	a	never-referred-to	thing?	Answer:	we	can	
get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	 something	 that	 supposedly	 is	never-referred-to,	because	 ‘a’	 refers	
from	outside	the	supposition,	and	the	thing	it	refers	to	is	never-referred-to	only	inside	















of	 thing.	 Isn’t	 that	 impossible?	 No,	 and	 for	 the	 same	 reason.	 We	 can	 suppose,	 of	







I	 can	now	give	another	argument	against	 the	 idea	 that	 in	 line	3	we	 suppose	 that	 ‘a’	
refers	to	a	p	thing.	If	this	were	right	then	we	could	use	existential	instantiation	to	show	
that	 the	 proposition	 that	 there	 are	 some	 never-referred-to	 things	 entails	 the	

















I	have	argued	that	 if,	 in	the	example	of	existential	 instantiation	that	we	started	with,	
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